\\server05\productn\N\NVJ\8-3\NVJ309.txt

unknown

Seq: 1

8-AUG-08

12:31

BEYOND CONJECTURE: LEARNING
ABOUT ECOSYSTEM MANAGEMENT
FROM THE GLEN CANYON
DAM EXPERIMENT
Alejandro E. Camacho*
INTRODUCTION
We have an unknown distance yet to run, an unknown river to explore. What
falls there are, we know not; what rocks beset the channel, we know not; what walls
rise over the river, we know not. Ah, well! we may conjecture many things.
....
The wonders of the Grand Canyon cannot be adequately represented in symbols
of speech, nor by speech itself. The resources of the graphic art are taxed beyond
their powers in attempting to portray its features. Language and illustration combined must fail. The elements that unite to make the Grand Canyon the most sublime
spectacle in nature are multifarious and exceedingly diverse.1

Since at least when John Wesley Powell first led his famous expedition
exploring its canyons in 1869, the Colorado River has been a substantial source
of uncertainty, holding many mysteries in its vastness for the many humans and
other species that have increasingly come to rely on it. Though the scientific
uncertainties with the Colorado may no longer be of the navigational variety
that Powell endured, they are no less significant. For just as long a time, this
uncertainty has been paired with a universal recognition that the Colorado
River is of indescribable value, serving as a vital natural resource for transportation, recreation, sustenance, energy, and other diverse uses. Increasingly,
these uncertainties and competing resource demands have taken their toll
throughout this vital ecosystem.
In response to these uncertainties and escalating resource demands, the
U.S. Congress and delegated administrative agencies have set up a variety of
regulatory institutions, indeed to “conjecture many things.” In particular for
the segment of the Colorado River downstream from the Glen Canyon Dam, a
decade ago the U.S. Department of the Interior established the Glen Canyon
* Associate Professor of Law, Notre Dame Law School. I would like to thank Andrea
Alpine, Kirk Emerson, Joe Feller, Dennis Kubly, and Mary Orton for their comments and
helpful insights into the Glen Canyon Dam Adaptive Management Program and the
Adaptive Management Work Group. I would also like to thank Bret Birdsong and the
Saltman Center at the UNLV Boyd School of Law for inviting me to participate in this
engaging conference and Dan Cory for his valuable research assistance.
1 JOHN WESLEY POWELL, CANYONS OF THE COLORADO 247, 394 (1895), available at http://
www.gutenberg.org/etext/8082.
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Dam Adaptive Management Program (“AMP”), comprised of a federal advisory committee (the Adaptive Management Work Group) as well as several
scientific and technical supporting bodies.2 Similar to other recent regulatory
experiments,3 the AMP has been advanced as a collaborative and adaptive
approach both to decrease scientific uncertainty in support of regulatory decision-making and to help manage contentious resource disputes—in this case,
the increasingly thorny conflict over the Colorado River’s finite natural
resources.
In contexts similar to the Glen Canyon Dam AMP, many scholars and
practitioners have emphasized the value of integrating public participation, collaborative decision-making, and adaptive management into regulatory
processes to assist in the resolution of natural resource disputes.4 In this vein, I
have argued before that meaningful stakeholder participation should serve a
central role in the management of natural resources and the regulation of land
use and that regulatory processes should account for the uncertainty inherent in
regulatory decisions by making such processes more adaptive.5 Particularly as
compared to traditional, prescriptive regulatory processes that provide uniform
but inflexible restrictions on private action too often at the expense of longterm environmental or other public values, multilateral, adaptive regulatory
2

See infra Part I.
Recent federal regulatory experiments include the Habitat Conservation Plan (“HCP”) program under section 10 of the Endangered Species Act (“ESA”), 16 U.S.C. § 1539 (2000);
regulatory negotiation under the Negotiated Rulemaking Act of 1990, 5 U.S.C. §§ 561-570a
(2000); and the negotiation of Final Project Agreements under the Environmental Protection
Agency’s Project XL. See Regulatory Reinvention (XL) Pilot Projects, 60 Fed. Reg. 27,282
(May 23, 1995).
4 See, e.g., THOMAS C. BEIERLE & JERRY CAYFORD, DEMOCRACY IN PRACTICE: PUBLIC
PARTICIPATION IN ENVIRONMENTAL DECISIONS 74-75 (2002) (suggesting early public participation is effective in incorporating public values and thus leads to better outcomes); Mary
Grisez Kweit & Robert W. Kweit, The Politics of Policy Analysis: The Role of Citizen
Participation in Analytic Decision Making, in CITIZEN PARTICIPATION IN PUBLIC DECISION
MAKING 19, 25-26 (Jack DeSario & Stuart Langton eds., 1987) (describing negative impacts
of only providing late participation opportunities); Stephanie Tai, Three Asymmetries of
Informed Environmental Decisionmaking, 78 TEMP. L. REV. 659, 693 (2005); see also Jody
Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1, 21-33
(1997) (proposing a normative model of collaborative governance as a more effective and
legitimate process for resolving regulatory disputes); J.B. Ruhl, Taking Adaptive Management Seriously: A Case Study of the Endangered Species Act, 52 U. KAN. L. REV. 1249
(2004); cf. Donna M. Nagy, Playing Peekaboo with Constitutional Law: The PCAOB and
Its Public/Private Status, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 975, 1063 (2005) (describing Administrative Procedure Act’s call for widespread early participation in rulemaking, before policy
decisions get “chiseled into bureaucratic stone” (quoting Alcaraz v. Block, 746 F.2d 593,
610 (9th Cir. 1984))).
5 See generally Alejandro E. Camacho, Can Regulation Evolve? Lessons from a Study in
Maladaptive Management, 55 UCLA L. REV. 293 (2007) [hereinafter Camacho, Can Regulation Evolve?]; Alejandro Esteban Camacho, Mustering the Missing Voices: A Collaborative Model for Fostering Equality, Community Involvement and Adaptive Planning in Land
Use Decisions, Installment One, 24 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3 (2005) [hereinafter Camacho, Mustering Part 1]; Alejandro Esteban Camacho, Mustering the Missing Voices: A Collaborative
Model for Fostering Equality, Community Involvement and Adaptive Planning in Land Use
Decisions, Installment Two, 24 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 269 (2005) [hereinafter Camacho, Mustering Part 2].
3
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processes have considerable promise as regulatory tools for addressing the
increasing number of natural resource disputes in the U.S.
Unfortunately, the Glen Canyon Dam AMP exemplifies how existing regulatory programs that have promised a more collaborative and adaptive
approach to decision-making have been adopted and implemented in a manner
that provides little chance for addressing and resolving complex natural
resource problems. This brief Article modestly attempts to reflect on what the
Glen Canyon Dam AMP and the circumstances surrounding its creation and
implementation can teach us about the challenges of creating successful multilateral and adaptive management protocols in natural resource management.
Born in the shadow of the law and improvised with too little thought as to its
structure, the Glen Canyon Dam AMP serves as a lesson on the limitations of
existing regulatory approaches in integrating meaningful participation and a
systematic process for adapting regulation.
I. OPACITY

AND

COLLABORATIVE ECOSYSTEM MANAGEMENT

A notable lesson provided by the Glen Canyon Dam AMP experiment
comes from the opacity and improvised nature of its creation, and in particular
the formation of the Glen Canyon Dam Adaptive Management Working Group
(“AMWG”). The roles of the Glen Canyon Dam AMP and AMWG in reconciling the various conflicting resource uses for the ecosystems of Glen Canyon
are at best murky, perhaps revealing an abdication of responsibility by the ultimate authority on this important resource question—the U.S. Congress. This
opacity and the extemporized creation of the Glen Canyon Dam AMP have
served to cripple severely the AMP’s efficacy at achieving any comprehensive
and systematic resolution of the complex and contentious disputes surrounding
Glen Canyon Dam.
A. Resource Competition and Regulatory Evasion in Glen Canyon
A number of increasingly competing legal mandates continue to govern
the existing resource uses of the Grand Canyon and Glen Canyon ecosystems.
The Colorado River Compact in 1922 allocated Colorado River water between
the four states of the upper Colorado River Basin and the three states of the
lower Colorado River Basin.6 The 1922 Colorado River Compact and subsequent amendments7 (collectively commonly referred to as the “Law of the
6 Colorado River Compact of 1922, art. III(d), 70 CONG. REC. 324 (1928) (“The States of
the Upper Division will not cause the flow of the river at Lee Ferry to be depleted below an
aggregate of 75,000,000 acre-feet for any period of ten consecutive years . . . .”).
7 The Law of the River incorporates a variety of compacts, federal laws, court decisions,
and decrees, contracts, and regulatory guidelines. These most notably include the Colorado
River Storage Project Act of 1956, 43 U.S.C. §§ 620-620(o) (2000); the Colorado River
Basin Project Act of 1968, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1501-1556; the Upper Colorado River Basin Compact of 1948, ch. 48, 63 Stat. 31 (1949); the Treaty on the Utilization of Waters of the
Colorado and Tijuana Rivers and of the Rio Grande, U.S.-Mex., Feb. 3 1944, 59 Stat. 1219;
and the decree of the Supreme Court in Arizona v. California, 547 U.S. 150 (2006) (incorporating decree in Arizona v. California, 376 U.S. 340 (1964), and subsequent amendments).
For a more complete list and collection of the sources of the “Law of the River,” see Bureau
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River”) place a strong priority on the water use rights of these seven state
parties.
Operation of the Colorado River in the Glen Canyon area for hydroelectric
power began a few decades later. The Glen Canyon Dam was approved under
the Colorado River Storage Project Act of 19568 to store water for use by the
upper Colorado River Basin or delivery to the lower Colorado River Basin.9 In
addition to satisfying water rights as directed by the Law of the River, the Glen
Canyon Dam was to serve a secondary purpose as a source of hydroelectric
power10—a function that has become increasingly important to numerous states
and consumers over time.11
Yet this use of the Colorado River as a source of energy has come with
considerable cost to other resources. Following construction in 1963, concerns
began to surface regarding the Glen Canyon Dam’s effects on the downstream
ecosystem of the Colorado River.12 By fundamentally altering the landscape
and ecosystems of the Glen and Grand Canyons, it became evident that operation of the Glen Canyon Dam was having a detrimental effect on a number of
native species, including the local extirpation of four fish species and the
decline of the humpback chub (Gila cypha).13 Operation of the dam has led to
a drastic decrease in sediment essential to the formation of the humpback
chub’s habitat and as a defense from predation.14 In addition, a lower and

of Reclamation: Lower Colorado Region—Law of the River, http://www.usbr.gov/lc/
region/g1000/lawofrvr.html (last visited May 18, 2008).
8 43 U.S.C. §§ 620-620(o).
9 Robert W. Adler, Restoring the Environment and Restoring Democracy: Lessons from the
Colorado River, 25 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 55, 80 (2007).
10 Id. at 80-81.
11 See Jeffrey W. Jacobs & James L. Wescoat Jr., Managing River Resources: Lessons
from Glen Canyon Dam, ENV’T, Mar. 2002, at 8, 10 (“Hydroelectric power generated at
Glen Canyon Dam is of vital importance for maintaining peak supply to a multistate power
grid operated by the U.S. Department of Energy’s Western Area Power Administration.”).
The water of the Colorado River drives turbines that generate 11.5 billion kilowatt-hours of
energy per year. Adler, supra note 9, at 58.
12 See RUSSELL MARTIN, A STORY THAT STANDS LIKE A DAM: GLEN CANYON AND THE
STRUGGLE FOR THE SOUL OF THE WEST (1989); GORDON A. MUELLER & PAUL C. MARSH,
LOST, A DESERT RIVER AND ITS NATIVE FISHES: A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE OF THE LOWER
COLORADO RIVER (2002), available at http://www.fort.usgs.gov/products/publications/
10026/10026.pdf; Robert Dolan et al., Man’s Impact on the Colorado River in the Grand
Canyon, 62 AM. SCIENTIST 392, 392-401 (1974).
13 Adler, supra note 9, at 59-60. The locally extirpated species include the bonytail chub,
roundtail chub, razorback sucker, and Colorado pikeminnow. Id.; Joseph M. Feller, Collaborative Management of Glen Canyon Dam: The Elevation of Social Engineering over Law,
8 NEV L.J. 896 (2008).
14 See Glen Canyon Dam Adaptive Management Program, Sediment and River Sand Bars
in the Grand Canyon, http://www.gcdamp.gov/keyresc/sediment.html (last visited May 18,
2008). For a discussion of the effects of the Glen Canyon Dam on sediment in the river
generally, see Eric Booth, Sediment Responses to Construction and Recent Adaptive Management of Glen Canyon Dam, Colorado River, Arizona (Mar. 10 2005), http://www.geology.ucdavis.edu/~shlemonc/html/trips/Grand%20Canyon%20Web/html/reports/PDFs/
Booth.pdf.
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more-uniform water temperature affects humpback chub reproduction and
development.15
Several federal resource laws have been developed to manage precisely
these types of impacts on biological resources. The impacts on native species
and habitat occurring along the Colorado River arose at the same time as a
growing awareness of environmental degradation throughout the United States,
prompting the U.S. Congress to enact the National Environmental Policy Act
(“NEPA”)16 and the Endangered Species Act (“ESA”).17 NEPA is a procedural statute that requires the preparation and disclosure of a detailed environmental impact statement (“EIS”) for major federal actions (including permit
approval) significantly affecting the quality of the environment.18 The more
substantive ESA expressly forbids harmful actions against species listed as
threatened or endangered.19 In addition to prohibiting the “take” of any endangered species by any person,20 the ESA prohibits any federal action21 that
would “jeopardize the continued existence”22 of any listed species or result in
the modification of its “critical habitat.”23 Any federal agency planning an
action that might jeopardize a listed species or modify its critical habitat must
obtain a “Biological Opinion” from the Fish and Wildlife Service (“FWS”) or
National Marine Fisheries Service (“NMFS”)24 that evaluates the action’s
impacts on the species. If the action would jeopardize a listed species or mod15

See U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, GRAND CANYON HUMPBACK CHUB POPULATION STABI(2006), available at http://www.gcmrc.gov/files/pdf/fs_2006_3109.pdf; Glen Canyon
Dam Adaptive Management Program, supra note 14.
16 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4375 (2000).
17 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2000 & Supp. IV 2004).
18 See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C). The EIS must include a detailed evaluation of impacts and
alternatives and provide public opportunities to comment through early open “scoping”
meetings, a public comment period on the impacts of and alternatives to the proposed action,
and agency responses to comments made on the proposed agency action.
19 See 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b) (2000 & Supp. III 2003); 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a) (2000).
20 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1). The statute broadly defines “take” to include to “harass, harm,
pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect, or to attempt to engage in any such
conduct.” Id. § 1532(19). Subsequent judicial opinions have upheld expansive regulatory
interpretations of this language to include substantial modification of habitat. See Babbitt v.
Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687 (1995) (determining Service
interpretation of statutory definition of “harm” to include “significant habitat modification or
degradation” that significantly impairs breeding, feeding, or sheltering patterns was reasonable); Palila v. Haw. Dep’t of Land & Natural Res., 639 F.2d 495, 497 (9th Cir. 1981).
21 Action includes any activity “authorized, funded, or carried out, in whole or in part, by
Federal agencies.” 50 C.F.R. § 402.02 (2007).
22 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (2000 & Supp. III 2003); see also Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437
U.S. 153 (1978) (finding jeopardy determination must be made strictly without regard to
costs and benefits of the proposed agency action).
23 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(2). If a species is listed, the Services must designate critical habitat
in areas where the species is found or which might provide additional habitat for the species’
recovery. See id. However, FWS has only designated critical habitat for thirty-six percent
of listed domestic species as of June 2006. See EUGENE H. BUCK ET AL., THE ENDANGERED
SPECIES ACT (ESA) IN THE 109TH CONGRESS: CONFLICTING VALUES AND DIFFICULT
CHOICES 3 (2006), available at http://www.ncseonline.org/NLE/CRSreports/06Nov/
RL33468.pdf.
24 The FWS must be consulted for actions affecting terrestrial or freshwater species, while
the NMFS must be consulted for those affecting marine species.
LIZING
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ify its critical habitat, the proposed action may proceed only if the FWS or
NMFS proposes and adopts any “reasonable and prudent alternatives” to avoid
those impacts.25 The humpback chub has been listed by the FWS since 1967 as
an endangered species.26
These and other environmental laws provide support for conserving and
protecting the vulnerable biological resources in Glen Canyon and Grand Canyon. Yet, changes in dam operations to protect the humpback chub would
affect if not directly conflict with both the water use rights provided for in the
Law of the River and the power output specifically promoted by the Colorado
River Storage Project Act of 1956 and subsequent amendments.27 With these
various seemingly rigid laws in place, there was no clear guidance in any of
these legal frameworks as to the relationship of their competing mandates.
Ostensibly in response to this conflict in this key segment of the Colorado
River, Congress enacted the Grand Canyon Protection Act of 1992
(“GCPA”).28 However, instead of resolving the conflicting mandates of the
Law of the River and the ESA, it provided a host of confusing and conflicting
directives to the Secretary of the Interior (“Secretary”) that have led to extensive delays and to this day cause considerable confusion.29 Despite its brevity,
the GCPA contains various impenetrably conflicting directives. First, the Secretary must operate “Glen Canyon Dam . . . in such a manner as to protect,
mitigate adverse impacts to, and improve the values for which Grand Canyon
National Park and Glen Canyon National Recreation Area were established . . . .”30 Second, the Secretary must fulfill the first directive “in a manner fully consistent with and subject to” the Law of the River.31 Last, nothing
in the GCPA “is intended to affect in any way—(1) the allocations of water
secured to the Colorado Basin States by any compact, law, or decree; or (2) any
Federal environmental law, including the Endangered Species Act.”32
The first two directives provide conflicting mandates of protecting the
Grand Canyon’s and Glen Canyon’s natural resources on the one hand and the
water rights established under the Law of the River on the other. Thus, Congress provided a mandate for the Secretary to protect two competing resources
despite their irreconcilable directives. As if that were not enough, the last provision further muddies the water by expressly carving out of the GCPA’s scope
the water rights established under the Law of the River (despite mandating their
25

16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(3)(A).
See Native Fish and Wildlife: Endangered Species, 32 Fed. Reg. 4001 (Mar. 11, 1967);
see also Determination of Critical Habitat for the Colorado River Endangered Fishes:
Razorback Sucker, Colorado Squawfish, Humpback Chub, and Bonytail Chub, 59 Fed. Reg.
13,374 (Mar. 21, 1994) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17).
27 Adler, supra note 9, at 79.
28 Grand Canyon Protection Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-575, §§ 1801-1809, 106 Stat.
4600, 4669-73.
29 See Adler, supra note 9, at 85 (“Given the difficulty the Bureau of Reclamation and other
agencies faced in deciding which existing laws had priority, an answer from Congress surely
would have been welcome. Unfortunately, the new law could be used in an introductory
philosophy text as an example of circular logic.”).
30 Grand Canyon Protection Act § 1802(a).
31 Id. § 1802(b).
32 Id. § 1806 (citation omitted).
26
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protection earlier). Finally, it also avoids any attempt at reconciling the conflict
between the water uses protected by the Law of the River and the biological
resources protected by federal environmental regulation by carving out federal
environmental laws from its purview. In short, the GCPA’s circular language
demonstrates Congress’ at best careless abdication of its responsibility to provide any guidance over how to resolve the competing uses of the Glen and
Grand Canyons.
Instead, Congress tendered the management and resolution of this intractable conflict to the Secretary of the Interior, who then established the Glen Canyon Dam AMP as an ongoing, collaborative regulatory salve. The GCPA
obliges the Secretary to manage the dam’s operation and develop an EIS on the
impacts of such operations.33 Because of the existence of substantial scientific
uncertainty regarding the effect of dam operations and other resource use activities on the downstream ecosystem, it also directs the Secretary to establish
“long-term monitoring programs and activities” “in consultation with” the governing federal agencies, the Secretary of Energy, the basin states, American
Indian tribes, academics, environmental organizations, the recreation industry,
and power users.34 In compliance with this brief instruction,35 in 1995 the
Secretary adopted an EIS for turbine upgrades to Glen Canyon Dam that proposed an “adaptive management” process whereby the effects of dam operations on downstream resources would be monitored and assessed.36 In 1996,
the Secretary created the Glen Canyon Dam AMP, including (1) the AMWG, a
twenty-five member federal advisory committee;37 (2) the Grand Canyon Monitoring and Research Center (“GCMRC”), a U.S. Geological Survey scientific
research program;38 (3) a Technical Work Group (“TWG”), filled by representatives from the same groups as the AMWG and purportedly tasked with liaising
between the AMWG and GCMRC;39 and (4) an independent science advisory

33

Id. §§ 1803-1804.
Id. §§ 1803(b), 1804(c)(3), 1805(a), (c).
35 The Bureau of Reclamation was already preparing an EIS prior to the passage of the
GCPA, but the GCPA established a deadline and other procedural requirements for the Secretary of the Interior and Bureau to follow. See ROBERT W. ADLER, RESTORING COLORADO
RIVER ECOSYSTEMS: A TROUBLED SENSE OF IMMENSITY 144-46 (2007).
36 See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, RECORD OF DECISION, OPERATION OF GLEN
CANYON DAM, FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT (1996), available at http://www.
usbr.gov/uc/rm/amp/pdfs/sp_appndxG_rod.pdf [hereinafter ROD]. The full text of the Final
Environmental Impact Statement can be found at the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation’s website.
Operation of Glen Canyon Dam: Final Environmental Statement, http://www.usbr.gov/uc/
library/envdocs/eis/gc/gcdOpsFEIS.html (last visited May 18, 2008).
37 Members of AMWG are listed at Glen Canyon Dam Adaptive Management Program –
AMWG Members, http://www.usbr.gov/uc/rm/amp/amwg/amwg_members.html (last visited
May 18, 2008).
38 Information about the GCMRC can be found at Grand Canyon Monitoring and Research
Center, http://www.gcmrc.gov/ (last visited May. 18, 2008).
39 Members of the Technical Work Group are listed at Glen Canyon Dam Adaptive Management Program – TWG Members, http://www.usbr.gov/uc/rm/amp/twg/twg_members.
html (last visited May 18, 2008).
34
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committee.40 Together, these various institutions were designated as the brain
trust for tackling the complex issues facing the Glen and Grand Canyons.
B. The Perils of Regulatory Opacity
With an ad hoc origin and an unclear congressional mandate, the Glen
Canyon Dam AMP is a prime example of the hastiness and opacity that is all
too common in the first generation of collaborative regulatory approaches to
addressing natural resource conflicts. Like other early collaborative regulatory
experiments, it relies on a hasty and uncertain mandate.41 Because Congress
has not provided any substantive guidance regarding how to balance the various competing priorities of water, power, and the environment, the AMP is able
to serve as a makeshift measure that allows the core decisions affecting the
Glen Canyon Dam to be ignored by the ultimate decision-maker on resource
management—Congress—and deferred as late as possible by the Secretary.
The shortcomings of such opacity are borne out by the disjointed and
slow-moving nature of the AMWG for the decade since the AMP was initially
established. Though the AMP has adopted a detailed strategic plan that
includes a mission statement and a range of goals for the Colorado River
ecosystem, an ad hoc committee of the AMWG concedes that “several of the
goals are in apparent conflict with one another” and that many stakeholders
“have never committed to defining or achieving specific resources objectives or
desired future resource conditions.”42 Tellingly, after a decade of being in
existence, “quantifiable targets have not been established for AMP goals
including the AMWG’s priority resources (humpback chub, sediment, and cultural resources).”43 In short, the fundamental conflict over how to reconcile the
various use priorities of the Colorado River has not been addressed in any thorough way by the AMWG, and it remains no closer to resolution.
In response to this confusion, perhaps rationally over the decade, the
AMWG often ends up focusing on “the details of the AMP, sometimes duplicating TWG efforts, instead of focusing on high-level executive issues and recommendations to the Secretary.”44 For example, the AMWG has spent
extensive time in detailed discussion over the line-item budget for the
GCMRC,45 as well as discussing the adequacy of the GCMRC’s science plan
40

A description of the Board of Science Advisors can be found at Purpose and Goals –
Glen Canyon Dam Adaptive Management Program, http://www.gcdamp.gov/aboutamp/pg.
html (last visited May 18, 2008).
41 See Camacho, Can Regulation Evolve?, supra note 5, at 302, 310, 349.
42 See ROLES AD HOC GROUP, GLEN CANYON DAM ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT WORK
GROUP, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE SECRETARY’S DESIGNEE 5 (2007), available at http:/ /www.usbr.gov/uc/rm/amp/amwg/mtgs/07may22cc/attach_03a.pdf [hereinafter
AMWG ROLES AD HOC GROUP REPORT].
43 See id.; see also id. at 9 (“Clear timeframe planning is not apparent.”); Telephone Interview with Andrea Alpine, Ctr. Director, Sw. Biological Sci. Ctr., U.S. Geological Survey
(Dec. 21, 2007) (“The GCMRC needs strong defined threshold values to do its job
effectively.”).
44 AMWG ROLES AD HOC GROUP REPORT, supra note 42, at 8.
45 Telephone Interview with Mary Orton, The Mary Orton Co., LLC, Facilitator, Glen Canyon Dam Adaptive Mgmt. Work Group (Dec. 17, 2007).
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despite little technical expertise to do so.46 Surely the Glen Canyon Dam AMP
collaborative experiment is destined to failure if its apex deliberative body concentrates its limited deliberations and expends most of its social capital on the
details and technical questions of the AMP. Yet, given the extensive regulatory
ambiguity and finite deliberation opportunities, such a circumstance is perhaps
to be expected from any effort by the AMWG at collaboration.
Even supporters of the AMWG process concede that there has been and
still is substantial uncertainty regarding what the function of the AMWG
should be in addressing this regulatory dispute.47 Though belated, an ad hoc
committee of the AMWG recently concluded that “collaboration among the
AMP participants and the overall effectiveness of the AMP would be improved
if [the AMWG were to] [e]stablish and agree to a common mission/goal for the
AMP.”48 The committee also concedes that “[t]o clarify progress in meeting
its responsibilities, the AMP should define measures of success.”49 Though
occurring a full eight years after the AMWG was created, at least the AMWG
is now seeking to clarify what Congress and the Secretary should have in 1997
when the AMWG was created.50
More alarmingly, this substantive opacity is exacerbated by the limited
procedural guidance provided by Congress to guide the AMWG’s exercise of
its authority. In fact, many of the participants in the Glen Canyon Dam AMP
have identified the confusion regarding the roles, responsibilities, and functions
of the various program components as “the most urgent issue” facing the
AMP.51 Without any clearly defined procedural decision-making framework,
the GCPA invites a procedural opacity that encourages powerful interests to
dominate the collaborative process while allowing the Secretary to evade
accountability for the ultimate decision.
To begin with, neither the GCPA nor the AMP’s operative documents
provide any clear information as to how to harmonize the AMWG process efficiently with the ESA’s Biological Opinion process or the procedures of other
environmental laws. As a result, there has been considerable uncertainty as to
the relationship of AMWG decisions with those provided in the FWS’s Biological Opinion for the humpback chub under the ESA.52 At a minimum then, this
inattention to the AMWG’s regulatory design has made for a less efficient regulatory process from the outset.
More fundamentally, the Glen Canyon Dam AMP’s regulatory design that
obscures the relationship of the AMWG with the Secretary has limited the effi46

Telephone Interview with Andrea Alpine, supra note 43.
Telephone Interview with Mary Orton, supra note 45.
48 See AMWG ROLES AD HOC GROUP REPORT, supra note 42, at 4.
49 Id. at 7.
50 Unfortunately, to date the thorough and constructive recommendations of the AMWG
Roles Ad Hoc Group have not been formally adopted by the Glen Canyon Dam AMP and
the Department of the Interior. Telephone Interview with Andrea Alpine, supra note 43.
51 See AMWG ROLES AD HOC GROUP REPORT, supra note 42, at 2; see also id. at 8 (“Some
AMWG members do not seem to have a clear understanding of their role, in particular
pertaining to giving advice and making recommendations to the Secretary of the Interior.”).
52 The lack of clarity is exacerbated by subsequent regulatory decisions. For example, the
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service’s 1994 Biological Opinion was vague as to the extent that
adaptive management is to be incorporated into the Reasonable and Prudent Alternative.
47
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cacy of this collaborative regulatory mechanism while buffering the Secretary
from accountability for the AMWG’s determinations. To be sure, the decisions
of the AMWG’s precise composition, its operating procedures, and the ultimate
substantive decisions are made by the Secretary; the AMP makes clear that the
AMWG is merely an advisory body to the Secretary.53 The AMWG makes
mere recommendations to the Secretary, which the Secretary is ostensibly free
to ignore or reject without explanation.
This detachment undoubtedly serves to shield the AMWG from attacks
that it is usurping the Secretary’s function,54 but it is at odds with the justification for the AMWG. As an alternative to conventional regulatory programs—
in which agencies are the hub of the regulatory process and many stakeholders
are at best peripheral commenters on agency proposals—multilateral, collaborative decision-making bodies like the AMWG are justified as a way to (1)
provide valuable information for shaping regulatory decisions that are more
satisfactory to stakeholders and the general public, (2) enhance accountability
for governmental services and decisions, and (3) thwart the potential for agency
capture and corruption.55 Simply put, collaborative and adaptive processes like
the AMWG are created to help make regulatory processes and outcomes better.
Presumably, the AMWG’s Charter objective of providing “advice and recommendations to the Secretary of the Interior relative to the operation of Glen
Canyon Dam in accordance with”56 the GCPA is based on the assumption that
the AMWG creates a better process for making decisions pertaining to Glen
Canyon Dam operations.57
Unfortunately, the AMWG’s structure raises doubts about its ability to
improve upon conventional regulatory processes. As currently designed, the
AMWG falls short of ensuring effective participation and does little to thwart
capture or increase the Secretary’s accountability. Because the AMWG is
merely an accessory to the regulatory process—without any explicit link to
final regulatory decisions—there is no way to know with confidence whether
53 See GLEN CANYON DAM ADAPTIVE MGMT. PROGRAM, STRATEGIC PLAN (2001), available
at http://www.usbr.gov/uc/rm/amp/pdfs/sp_final.pdf.
54 AMWG ROLES AD HOC GROUP REPORT, supra note 42, at 9.
55 See Thomas C. Beierle & Jerry Cayford, Dispute Resolution as a Method of Public Participation, in THE PROMISE AND PERFORMANCE OF ENVIRONMENTAL CONFLICT RESOLUTION
53, 63-66 (Rosemary O’Leary & Lisa B. Bingham eds., 2003) (discussing the instrumental,
substantive, and normative values of public participation); Michael C. Dorf & Charles F.
Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267, 317 (1998)
(discussing fundamental value of direct and continuous participation); id. at 288 (stating
local participation in service provision evaluation can serve to increase the accountability of
regulatory institutions).
56 Charter of the Glen Canyon Dam Adaptive Management Work Group, Federal Advisory
Committee, Bureau of Reclamation, July 19, 2006, ¶ 2, available at http://www.usbr.gov/uc/
rm/amp/amwg/pdfs/amwg_charter.pdf.
57 Similarly, the EIS’s directives that the AMWG would “[p]rovide the framework for AMP
policy, goals, and direction,” “[d]evelop recommendations for modifying operating criteria
and other resource management actions,” and “[f]acilitate coordination and input from interested parties” seek to improve the regulatory process and decisions over conventional regulatory decision-making. U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR,
OPERATION OF GLEN CANYON DAM: FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT 36 (1995),
available at http://www.usbr.gov/uc/envdocs/eis/gc/gcdOpsFEIS.html [hereinafter FEIS]
(follow “Chapter 2” hyperlink).
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the AMP is obtaining participation that actually leads to better (or even better
informed) decisions or obtaining such participation in an efficient or fair way.
Even some of the AMWG members have asserted that there is a “lack of clear
communication and understanding of how recommendations are relayed to the
Secretary’s office and how the Department of the Interior (DOI) responds to
these recommendations.”58 To its credit, in response to these concerns the Secretary’s Designee has responded in writing to AMWG recommendations for the
past year.59 Nonetheless, as the Secretary can deviate from recommendations
without explanation, stakeholders still have a substantial incentive to circumvent the AMWG process to alter the final decision. Indeed, in numerous
instances, stakeholders have lobbied the Secretary seeking a rejection of the
AMWG’s recommendations after extensive deliberation by the AMWG.60
Much human capital thus is expected to go into an advisory body for which we
are unclear about its mandate and how it even influences the ultimate decision.
Furthermore, the murky relationship between the AMWG’s recommendations and the Secretary’s decisions (or indecision) allows both the AMWG and
Secretary to evade responsibility for reconciling the competing use priorities of
the Colorado River or other difficult decisions regarding management of the
dam. AMWG representatives can always absolve themselves of responsibility
by saying it is the Secretary’s ultimate decision, and the Secretary can use the
AMWG or its muddled procedural process to deflect criticism or even delay
resolution of substantial issues. In short, the decision-making process continues to rely on the same hierarchical, ultimately unilateralist New Deal and
Interest Representation models of regulatory decision-making61—and thus is
subject to the familiar critiques of conventional command-and-control regulation as ineffective, inefficient, and undemocratic,62 and arguably is subject to
less accountability than provided by even traditional regulatory processes.
Though insufficient attention was given to the AMWG when it was established, like many other early collaborative regulatory processes, it has still
ended up serving as a de facto surrogate for more traditional regulatory decision-making. Though unfortunately neither the AMP nor any other public or
private entity has performed a systematic study evaluating the AMWG’s decisions, anecdotally the Secretary normally adopts the recommendations of the
58

AMWG ROLES AD HOC GROUP REPORT, supra note 42, at 11. In response to these
concerns, an ad hoc committee of the AMWG recently recommended: “The Secretary’s
Designee . . . convey the outcome of these discussions and the final DOI decision in writing
to the AMWG within 45 days of the AMWG meeting. A written status report will be provided if a final DOI decision is not reached within the 45 day process.” Id.
59 See Correspondence with Mary Orton, The Mary Orton Co., LLC, Facilitator, Glen Canyon Dam Adaptive Mgmt. Work Group (Jan. 15, 2008) (on file with author).
60 Telephone Interview with Mary Orton, supra note 45. As one might expect, this has been
particularly the case in circumstances in which the recommendation is not a unanimous
recommendation but rather one based on super-majority vote. See id.
61 See Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L.
REV. 1667, 1711-90 (1975); Richard B. Stewart, Administrative Law in the Twenty-First
Century, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 437, 440-43 (2003).
62 Administrative regulation is regularly characterized as inefficient, ineffective, and
undemocratic. See Freeman, supra note 4, at 3, 35; Philip J. Harter, Negotiating Regulations: A Cure for Malaise, 71 GEO. L.J. 1, 6-7 (1982).
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AMWG.63 The first lesson, then, from Glen Canyon Dam is that providing ad
hoc, vague directives for experimental, collaborative regulatory processes
invites delay and indecision to the detriment of those resources harmed by inaction—perhaps biological resources like the humpback chub,64 if not others as
well. While the opacity might allow for interesting and valuable regulatory
experiments in the meantime,65 that alone does not make the lack of transparency and clarity a good thing.
This lesson serves as an addendum to a familiar supposition by proponents
of collaborative regulatory processes that such approaches should rely heavily
on the particular stakeholders to devise the process for and outcome of the
dispute resolution.66 The experience of the Glen Canyon Dam AMP in fact is
more congruent with other empirical studies of mediation in public policy disputes that have found that mediation is ineffective when either “participants do
not recognize each other’s rights,” or “when the process is being utilized only
to delay any action or to create the illusion that something is being done.”67
The failure of Congress and the Secretary to provide the AMWG any guidance
regarding the relationship of these competing priorities, nor the authority or
responsibility for resolving this fundamental dispute, allowed the AMWG to
serve as a way to evade or delay a serious, comprehensive resolution of this
conflict. As such, it practically ensured that the AMWG would be disappointing as a collaborative regulatory experiment.
II. ADAPTATION

AND

REGULATORY EXPERIMENTATION

Similarly, the experience of the Glen Canyon Dam AMP suggests that
another form of clarity—transparent and measurable regulatory targets—is fundamentally important for a multilateral process to be effective. When regulatory programs like the AMP fail to set concrete regulatory goals and deadlines,
it becomes almost impossible to develop a method for systematically evaluating
the regulatory process itself. This weakness, exacerbated by the persistent fail63

Telephone Interview with Mary Orton, supra note 45.
See Adler, supra note 9, at 72 (stating humpback chub population has “plummeted from
over 10,000 in the early 1980s to fewer than 3000 by the early 1990s, although some recovery appeared evident by late 2005”).
65 See infra Part II.
66 See, e.g., LAWRENCE SUSSKIND & JEFFREY CRUIKSHANK, BREAKING THE IMPASSE: CONSENSUAL APPROACHES TO RESOLVING PUBLIC DISPUTES 77-78 (1987); Lawrence Susskind,
An Alternative to Robert’s Rules of Order for Groups, Organizations, and Ad Hoc Assemblies That Want to Operate by Consensus, in THE CONSENSUS BUILDING HANDBOOK 3, 2627, 43 (Lawrence Susskind et al. eds., 1999). But see generally George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 17 (1984) (stating
that parties are more likely to litigate than engage in settlement negotiations when their
respective legal rights are uncertain).
67 LAWRENCE SUSSKIND ET AL., MEDIATING LAND USE DISPUTES: PROS AND CONS 19
(2000); cf. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Getting to “Let’s Talk”: Comments on Collaborative
Environmental Dispute Resolution Processes, 8 NEV L.J. 835, 846 (2008) (“What happens
when, in the domestic context, legal rules are ambiguous or arguable or have not kept pace
with environmental or technological change? If a powerful ‘have’ wants to grab resources or
delay through objections, continuing to litigate and contest legal doctrines and meanings
may remain an option.”).
64
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ure of regulatory institutions to engage in systematic monitoring and assessment of regulatory programs, is all too often overlooked or neglected by both
governmental regulators and scholars of administrative regulation.
The AMP was and is a regulatory experiment, proposed as a novel way to
attend to a variety of competing and conflicting use demands on a network of
vital natural resources.68 This experiment included both collaborative and
adaptive regulatory features. The first collaborative characteristic, embodied
by the AMWG, proposes providing a range of interested and affected stakeholders meaningful involvement in regulatory decision-making.69 Presumably,
this feature was adopted in the belief that doing so is more likely to lead to
better regulatory decisions than traditional regulation that relies almost exclusively on agency resources and presumed expertise.70 The second adaptive
management element, most directly embodied by the GCMRC, emphasizes a
reliance on long-term monitoring and research protocols that seek repeated
monitoring and, if necessary, adjustment of regulatory restrictions to account
for new information or changed circumstances that arise during implementation.71 This adaptive element, envisioned as providing more cost-effective and
effective regulation, is particularly important in circumstances like those surrounding the Glen Canyon Dam EIS, in which information is uncertain and
regulatory conclusions are necessarily tentative.72
Though it is certainly possible (and to some even probable) that integrating collaborative and adaptive management features into a regulatory process
could make the regulatory process and resultant outcomes “better,” whether
including such features in the AMP program will actually do so is undeniably
unproven. Through passage of the GCPA and the Secretary’s creation of the
AMP, Congress and the Secretary evidently decided to engage in a regulatory
experiment. Yet in their haste to carry out this trial program, neither Congress
nor the Secretary has bothered to structure the AMP program to function adequately as a systematic experiment on regulatory decision-making.
68 See Glen Canyon Dam Adaptive Management Program Home Page, http://www.gcdamp.
gov (last visited May 18, 2008).
69 Grand Canyon Protection Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-575, §§ 1803(b), 1804(c)(3),
1805(c), 106 Stat. 4600, 4670-72.
70 Cf. Camacho, Can Regulation Evolve?, supra note 5, at 304-05 (“[S]ome practitioners
involved in species-conservation disputes saw the HCP program as a necessary alternative to
the ESA’s conventional but inflexible, expensive, and ultimately ineffective approach to
resolving resource conflicts . . . . The HCP process was thus seen as fostering better agency
decisions by incorporating participation, rigorous and comprehensive data gathering and
analysis, and subsequent monitoring and adaptation into the regulatory process.”).
71 See Grand Canyon Protection Act § 1805(a).
72 See GLEN CANYON DAM ADAPTIVE MGMT. PROGRAM, supra note 53, at 1-2 (“Due to the
significant levels of uncertainty surrounding the resources of the Colorado River ecosystem
and the effects of dam operations on those resources, the Glen Canyon Dam Environmental
Impact Statement stipulated an adaptive management approach. This approach allows for
scientific experimentation that adds to the knowledge base of effects of the operation of Glen
Canyon Dam, primarily on downstream resources, and results in the development of recommendations to the Secretary of the Interior regarding additional operational changes.”); cf.
Menkel-Meadow, supra note 67, at 850 (“[T]here is growing recognition that many governance decisions . . . might need to be transitional, contingent, and flexible, with ongoing
processes and opportunities for reconsideration and reopening and renegotiation as conditions change and political systems mature.”).
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For a regulatory program to be effective—including but not limited to any
program that relies on collaborative and adaptive features—the responsible
agency must collect and respond to information learned about the program during its implementation.73 This need is simply made more manifest in the context of a nascent regulatory experiment, such as the Glen Canyon Dam AMP.
And though the AMP does incorporate an experimentalist approach to resource
management that attempts to monitor, evaluate, and adjust regulatory decisions
during implementation, Congress, the Secretary, and the AMWG have not
developed a similar feedback mechanism at a more macroscopic, programmatic
level: to monitor, evaluate, and adjust the regulatory program in response to
information gleaned as the AMP has aged over the past decade.
To its credit, unlike almost all other regulatory programs,74 the Glen Canyon Dam AMP does include a well-resourced, formal information gathering
and assessment apparatus—the GCMRC—that is charged with the scientific
monitoring and research of the Colorado River ecosystem.75 The AMP also
includes a Technical Work Group, proposed as the liaison between the AMWG
and GCMRC on scientific and technical issues, and Independent Review
Panels, whose primary responsibility is “to assess the quality of research, monitoring, or science being conducted by the Adaptive Management Program and
to make recommendations to improve it.”76 This emphasis of the AMP on
scientific information gathering is particularly robust as compared to other regulatory programs. Given adequate guidance from the AMWG on the priorities
for inquiry, these institutions are very capable at studying any scientific or technical questions that the AMWG considers relevant to making long-term
resource management decisions.77
However, though the AMP adopts a process for monitoring and evaluating
dam operations, the AMP does not systematically monitor and evaluate
whether the regulatory program’s processes are being effective at achieving
program goals. Straightforward but valuable information about the activities of
the AMWG are simply not compiled. How often are AMWG recommenda73

See Camacho, Can Regulation Evolve?, supra note 5, at 335-44; Barry L. Johnson, Introduction to the Special Feature: Adaptive Management – Scientifically Sound, Socially Challenged?, 3 CONSERVATION ECOLOGY (1999), http://www.consecol.org/vol3/iss1/art10/
(“[A]daptive management considers change and cooperation as inherent to management. . . .
To help develop new institutional arrangements, we might apply adaptive management
experiments not just to the resource, but also to institutions themselves.”); J.B. Ruhl, Is the
Endangered Species Act Eco-Pragmatic?, 87 MINN. L. REV. 885, 935 n.221 (2003).
74 See, e.g., Camacho, Can Regulation Evolve?, supra note 5, at 337 (stating that with
regard to the ESA’s HCP program, “the Services and Congress have wholly failed to
develop a systematic and coordinated framework for learning about HCP decisionmaking
processes, making it impossible to evaluate and adapt the program’s data-gathering, participation, monitoring, and adaptation methods”).
75 See GLEN CANYON DAM ADAPTIVE MGMT. PROGRAM, supra note 53, at 6.
76 Id.
77 Unfortunately, even these promising features of the AMP have been squandered because
of the aforementioned opacity of the AMP’s goals. See supra Part I.B. The GCMRC has
periodically asked the AMWG for clear guidance on the scientific questions that the
GCMRC should investigate, so as to be most helpful to the AMWG in making its resource
management determinations. Yet to date the GCMRC has received limited direction. Telephone Interview with Andrea Alpine, supra note 43.
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tions based on a consensus? On a super-majority vote? How often are AMWG
recommendations adopted by the Secretary? This and more information would
undoubtedly be useful in assessing the effectiveness of the AMP’s regulatory
framework in achieving meaningful participation and resource management,
and even perhaps reinforcing the accountability of the regulatory actors to Congress and the public.
Similarly, in assessing the value of adaptive management in the regulatory
process, key questions are not methodically and publicly assessed, such as:
What management experiments have been adopted by the AMWG for implementation by the Center? Have such experiments utilized active78 or passive79
adaptive management? How costly are they? How often do they lead to
changes in permanent management decisions? Unsurprisingly, then, more
complex questions that go to the root of the AMP’s process for facilitating
effective participation, gathering information, and making management decisions are ignored. These include: (1) Is the composition of the AMWG representative of the parties potentially affected by dam operations? (2) How much
non-stakeholder public involvement is there in AMWG deliberations? (3) Does
the Secretary engage parties ex parte outside of the AMWG process in his or
her deliberations? (4) How effective is the TWG as a liaison between the
AMWG and GCMRC? (5) How if at all do the TWG and Independent Review
Boards improve the scientific information and/or conclusions provided by the
GCMRC? These questions are rarely evaluated, and the AMP has never been
adjusted to respond to their answers.
A concrete example of the AMP’s wasted opportunity is the muchadmired series of Glen Canyon Dam experimental floods. The Secretary’s
1995 EIS and associated 1996 Record of Decision for turbine upgrades to Glen
Canyon Dam provided the opportunity for a series of experimental flood
releases from the dam as part of the AMP’s efforts to learn more about the
downstream ecosystem and ostensibly guide future dam operations.80 After
much study and deliberation, over the decade since its creation, the AMP has
engaged in two high flow experiments and another two significant test flows.81
These experiments have been praised by many as successful examples of
exactly the kind of adaptive implementation that is needed in natural resource
management.82
Certainly, these experiments have revealed important information, particularly regarding the sediment and nutrient dynamics of the ecosystem down78

See Availability of a Final Addendum to the Handbook for Habitat Conservation Planning and Incidental Take Permitting Process, 65 Fed. Reg. 35,252 (June 1, 2000) (“Active
adaptation is developing and testing a range of alternative strategies.”).
79 See id. (“Passive adaptation is where information obtained is used to determine a single
best course of action.”).
80 See FEIS, supra note 57; ROD, supra note 36.
81 Adler, supra note 9, at 100-01.
82 See, e.g., Holly Doremus, Adaptive Management, the Endangered Species Act, and the
Institutional Challenges of “New Age” Environmental Protection, 41 WASHBURN L.J. 50,
78-79 (2001); Vicky J. Meretsky et al., Balancing Endangered Species and Ecosystems: A
Case Study of Adaptive Management in Grand Canyon, 25 ENVTL. MGMT. 579 (2000); Bernice Wuethrich, Deliberate Flood Renews Habitat, 272 SCI. 344, 344-45 (1995).
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stream from the Glen Canyon Dam,83 and perhaps even temporarily improved
habitat for the humpback chub.84 The full value of this information for natural
resource management at the Glen Canyon Dam and more generally, however,
is substantially hindered by the uncertainty of the regulatory program. The
AMP provides no concrete deadlines or guidance delineating when information
gleaned from such regulatory experiments can and must be used to adjust longterm management protocols. Put another way, the EIS and GCPA are silent on
how much of a reduction in uncertainty must occur for management protocols
to undergo adaptation.
This practice of failing to delineate clear goals, standards, and deadlines
for adjusting earlier management decisions has contributed to the lack of adaptation of long-term operations at the Glen Canyon Dam. To date, a decade after
the AMP was established, there still have been no adjustments of long-term
management operations at the dam.85 Instead, the Bureau of Reclamation is
ramping up yet another EIS process to study a variety of alternatives for a longterm experimental plan for the future operation of Glen Canyon Dam.86 Without a defined feedback loop for integrating information learned about the efficacy of experimental management protocols, the otherwise valuable
experiments have not resulted in any regulatory adaptation.
Regulatory programs like the AMP can (but typically do not) serve as
important, active tools for teaching us how to make the law itself more effective at integrating effective public participation and adaptive management.
Regulatory agencies, and ultimately Congress and the public, should be periodically and systematically evaluating all regulatory programs by articulating and
evaluating these questions: (1) What are the goals of a regulatory program
(e.g., increasing democratic participation, cultivating valuable substantive data,
and achieving sufficient environmental protection)? (2) How effective are the
program’s adopted procedures at attaining these goals? (3) How can the program be adjusted to better achieve these results? Experimental regulatory programs like the AMP and even more traditional programs must be made
transparent, and their operative goals clear and measurable, in order to make it
possible to evaluate and adapt the regulatory process itself to account for lessons learned. Such goals, standards, and systematic assessments serve to cabin
the uncertainty that exists when the program is initially created and facilitate
regulatory learning that can be used not only to improve the Glen Canyon Dam
AMP but future regulatory programs as well.
III. STRUCTURING COLLABORATIVE PROCESSES
The Glen Canyon Dam AMP also provides another important (though perhaps unsurprising) lesson for the burgeoning use of multilateral regulatory
83

Adler, supra note 9, at 100; Doremus, supra note 82, at 79.
Adler, supra note 9, at 100; Doremus, supra note 82, at 79.
85 Telephone Interview with Dennis Kubly, Chief, Adaptive Mgmt. Group, Envtl. Res. Div.,
Upper Colo. Reg’l Office, U.S. Bureau of Reclamation (Dec. 18, 2007).
86 Glen Canyon Dam: Long-Term Experimental Plan – Reclamation – Upper Colorado
Region, http://www.usbr.gov/uc/rm/gcdltep/index.html (last visited May 18, 2008). The
long-term plan is currently slated to be completed by October 2008. Id.
84
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approaches to addressing natural resource conflicts: The procedural structure
of the multilateral working group plays a considerable role in its effectiveness
at even addressing, let alone reconciling, public disputes. In particular, the
Glen Canyon Dam AMP shows that the composition of the stakeholder group,
the decision rule adopted for group votes, and the role of the convenor are each
crucial and require more reflection than the Secretary provided for the Glen
Canyon Dam AMP.
The AMP’s key stakeholder group, the Adaptive Management Work
Group, includes twenty-five members that represent a relatively broad range of
interests. These include the convenor (the Secretary’s Designee-representative), various federal agencies,87 states,88 recreational interests,89 hydropower
interests,90 Native American tribes,91 and two local environmental groups.92
Though the group is reasonably diverse, there is still a question regarding
whether the group is sufficiently representative. This is in large part because of
the operative rule chosen for voting on AMWG decisions. The AMWG’s operating procedures dictate that “[t]he group should attempt to seek consensus but,
in the event that consensus is not possible, a vote should be taken. . . .
Approval of a motion requires a two-thirds majority of members present and
voting.”93 The exact point in time when consensus may be established to be
impossible—thus paving the way for a super-majority vote—is never delineated in the AMWG’s operating procedures. The Secretary’s Designee, not the
mediator-facilitator, decides on his or her own option when to switch to a twothirds vote.94
The Glen Canyon Dam AMWG demonstrates that decisions as to the
structure of the regulatory program—stakeholder group composition, the
adopted decision rule, the convenor’s role in decision-making—can function to
allow a stakeholder group to suppress meaningful participation and collaboration rather than cultivate it. The exact group composition perhaps plays a
smaller role in a consensus-based process; as long as the stakeholder group is
broad and diverse, decisions made by the group can reasonably be considered
87

Federal agencies include the Bureau of Indian Affairs, Bureau of Reclamation, National
Park Service, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, and the Department of Energy-Western Area
Power Administration. Glen Canyon Dam Adaptive Management Program – AMWG Members, supra note 37.
88 The Arizona Department of Water Resources, Colorado River Board of California, Colorado River Commission of Nevada, Colorado Water Conservation Board, New Mexico State
Engineer’s Office, Utah Division of Water Resources, and the Wyoming State Engineer’s
Office represent the seven Colorado River Basin States. In addition, the Arizona Game and
Fish Department is a party. Id.
89 These include the Federation of Fly Fishers and the Grand Canyon River Guides. Id.
90 Two federal power purchase contractors are members: the Colorado River Energy Distributors Association and the Utah Associated Municipal Power Systems. Id.
91 The Hualapai Tribe, the Hopi Tribe, the Navajo Nation, the Southern Paiute Consortium,
and the Pueblo of Zuni are all active AMWG members. In addition, the San Juan Southern
Paiute Tribe is an in active member. Id.
92 The Grand Canyon Trust and the Grand Canyon Wildlands Council are the two environmental members of the AMWG. Id.
93 Operating Procedures of the Glen Canyon Dam Adaptive Management Work Group, Jan.
17, 2002, available at http://www.usbr.gov/uc/rm/amp/amwg/pdfs/OP_02apr24.pdf.
94 Telephone Interview with Mary Orton, supra note 45.
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without much controversy to be reflective of the various affected interests and
thus quite persuasive in guiding public policy. As such, in circumstances in
which consensus was reached by the AMWG in developing a recommendation,
there is a fairly strong argument that such counsel should be quite influential (if
not determinative) in shaping the ultimate decision.
However, when the decision rule is less than consensus, the exact composition becomes crucial, and the probative value of decisions made by such a
group is less clear. There is no clear, objective formula for deciding what proportion of votes should be allocated to recreational, hydropower, and environmental values and interests, let alone federal agencies, states, and tribes. Did
the Secretary, by allocating two votes to environmental groups, implicitly
decide that environmental interests are less important than the interests of
American Indian tribes, of which there are six? Is the determination of a federal agency such as the Fish and Wildlife Service of equal weight as the preference of a recreational organization? Whether intentionally or not, with a
majority or super-majority decision rule, the precise breakdown of votes ends
up serving as a de facto determination as to the relative prevalence—if not
value—of the various interests at stake. Yet there is no record of any public
discussion as to the relative merits of various interests ever taking place.95
Instead, the AMWG’s composition is quite likely the product of hurried lobbying efforts by a range of interested parties behind closed doors and ultimately
an unexplained and unsupported determination by the Secretary. As a result, an
AMWG’s ad hoc committee concluded that “some stakeholders feel disenfranchised because some interests have more representation on the group; this
is especially significant when consensus is not achieved and issues get resolved
by a vote.”96
Though it is likely that these design questions were not considered in any
detail when the AMWG was established—certainly not publicly—they
undoubtedly have an effect on the actual operation of the multilateral group.
As there are no time constraints or other detailed protocols governing when to
seek consensus and when to follow a two-thirds decision rule, the convenor’s
discretion becomes of critical importance in determining how the AMWG actually functions. As the Secretary’s Designee has changed periodically, each has
taken different approaches. Several of the Secretary’s Designees have been
quick to bring agenda motions to a two-thirds vote rather than further seek a
consensus.97 Tellingly, particularly recently the one interest that has been able
to fairly consistently put together a two-thirds majority is hydroelectric power,
working with states (and sometimes tribes) who increasingly have been concerned regarding the expedient availability of economical energy.98
An ad hoc committee of the AMWG in fact recently acknowledged that
“consensus building is often frustrated by the fact that the AMWG can simply
develop a recommendation to the Secretary with a vote.”99 As a result, stake95

Telephone Interview with Dennis Kubly, supra note 85.
AMWG ROLES AD HOC GROUP REPORT, supra note 42, at 6-7.
97 Telephone Interview with Mary Orton, supra note 45.
98 Telephone Interview with Andrea Alpine, supra note 43; Telephone Interview with Dennis Kubly, supra note 85.
99 See AMWG ROLES AD HOC GROUP REPORT, supra note 42, at 3.
96

\\server05\productn\N\NVJ\8-3\NVJ309.txt

960

unknown

Seq: 19

NEVADA LAW JOURNAL

8-AUG-08

12:31

[Vol. 8:942

holders consistently in the minority are increasingly seeing little incentive to
expend their limited resources in a process that consistently ignores them, turning instead to costly litigation to address issues the AMWG has not confronted.100 Ultimately, such public law litigation may indeed serve a
destabilization function suggested by some scholars101 and encourage the reengagement of a collaborative approach to addressing the resource conflict at
Glen Canyon Dam. Yet, the fact that key stakeholders have returned to the
adversarial model with all its shortcomings—not to review the AMWG’s activities, but to address issues that the AMWG has failed to address—provides
evidence of the deficiency of the existing AMWG as a forum for even tackling,
let alone resolving, the Glen Canyon Dam’s natural resource challenges.102
Because neither Congress nor the Secretary nor the AMP has publicly and
rigorously considered these structural questions, or monitored them for their
effectiveness at attaining their intended results, the AMWG’s recommendations
become considerably less probative. Recommendations based on a supermajority vote certainly do not indicate a consensus of opinion; they instead
reflect a particular voting block’s preferences that the Secretary very well
might have surmised without such a time- and resource-consuming forum. Furthermore, such AMWG recommendations may not reflect the opinion of those
most knowledgeable about a particular issue, but merely a strong interest
group. Though such a circumstance would certainly not be unique to a collaborative multilateral process, it does serve as yet another lesson of the need to
attend to the design of decision-making institutions more scrupulously than has
been done in the past generally and the Glen Canyon Dam AMP in particular.
It also reinforces the need to monitor and evaluate such institutions closely to
determine whether they are achieving the goals they were set out to address.
By pointing out the structural inattentiveness in the formation of the
AMWG, I do not mean to suggest that consensus is always the superior decision rule for multilateral stakeholder decision-making processes like the
AMWG.103 There is certainly value to a consensus decision rule—some schol100 See Complaint For Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Grand Canyon Trust v. U.S.
Bureau of Reclamation, No. 3:07-cv-08164-DGC (D. Ariz. Dec. 7, 2007) (lawsuit by environmental group participant of the Glen Canyon AMWG against Bureau of Reclamation for
violating the Endangered Species Act and National Environmental Policy Act).
101 See Bradley C. Karkkainen, Getting to “Let’s Talk”: Legal and Natural Destabilizations and the Future of Regional Collaboration, 8 NEV. L.J. 811 (2008); Charles F. Sabel &
William H. Simon, Destabilization Rights: How Public Law Litigation Succeeds, 117
HARV. L. REV. 1015 (2004).
102 Indeed, the Secretary’s Designee recently took the unprecedented step of deciding to
move forward with preparation for another experimental test at Glen Canyon Dam without
asking the AMWG for its recommendation. See Notice of Public Meeting, 73 Fed. Reg. 500
(Jan. 3, 2008); Shaun McKinnon, Flood May Help Revive a River: River’s 3rd Planned
Flood May Aid Fish, Environment, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Feb. 28, 2008, http://www.azcentral.
com/arizonarepublic/news/articles/0225coloriver-fish0225.html; Memorandum from Brenda
W. Burman, Deputy Assistant Sec’y – Water & Science, Sec’y’s Designee for the Glen
Canyon Dam AMWG, to the Glen Canyon Dam AMWG (Dec. 20, 2007), available at http://
www.gcmrc.gov/research/high_flow/2008/files/2008_potential_hft.pdf.
103 Similarly, there certainly is merit to providing the convenor discretion in carrying out his
or her duties, and it is conceivable that the current composition of the AMWG is the optimal
arrangement.
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ars have pointed out that a consensus rule promotes a perhaps more valuable
form of participation because all represented interests must be taken into
account.104 A consensus rule can also enhance the credibility of regulatory
decisions because the parties and public at-large are aware that all substantially
affected parties have been persuaded that the outcome is satisfactory.105 However, in certain circumstances a non-consensus decision rule may be plausibly
preferred. Even if consensus is understood to require something less than unanimity,106 achieving consensus is simply more difficult than obtaining a majority or even super-majority.107 Though there are many examples where
consensus was achieved even in an acrimonious setting,108 a consensus rule
undoubtedly is more likely to encourage holdouts that can result in deadlock
and perhaps ultimately the under-use or under-protection of resources.109 In
short, though perhaps not as effective at achieving all the participatory virtues
of a consensus rule, a decision rule requiring less than unanimity still may
reasonably be chosen as being more likely to lead to decisive action.
Nor does this critique of the Glen Canyon Dam AMWG argue that multilateral dispute resolution mechanisms have no value except in circumstances in
which agreement is obtained. It may certainly be the case that despite regularly
failing to lead to consensus, a multilateral stakeholder group like the AMWG
may still be valuable. There is growing empirical evidence in natural resource
and other regulatory contexts that even where agreement does not occur, a multilateral stakeholder forum can expand available information, improve stakeholder relationships, and increase participant and public confidence in
governmental institutions.110
104 See Camacho, Mustering Part 2, supra note 5, at 318; Jody Freeman & Laura I.
Langbein, Regulatory Negotiation and the Legitimacy Benefit, 9 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 60,
132-33 (2000); Philip J. Harter, Fear of Commitment: An Affliction of Adolescents, 46 DUKE
L.J. 1389, 1411, 1420 (1997).
105 See Camacho, Mustering Part 2, supra note 5, at 318.
106 While there is no general agreement as to what constitutes consensus, most mediation
professionals agree that consensus does not require all parties to be completely content with
the result, but rather that the agreement is one that affected parties can tolerate, particularly
compared to the parties’ other options. See LAWRENCE SUSSKIND, CONSENSUS BLDG. INST.,
USING ASSISTED NEGOTIATION TO SETTLE LAND USE DISPUTES: A GUIDEBOOK FOR PUBLIC
OFFICIALS 2 (1999); Susskind, supra note 66, at 6-7, 32-33.
107 See Camacho, Mustering Part 2, supra note 5, at 317-18.
108 See SUSSKIND, supra note 106, at 7, 10, 16; Norman Dale, Case 10, Cross-Cultural
Community-Based Planning: Negotiating the Future of Haida Gwaii (British Columbia), in
THE CONSENSUS BUILDING HANDBOOK, supra note 66, at 923, 923-50; John Forester, Dealing with Deep Value Differences, in THE CONSENSUS BUILDING HANDBOOK, supra note 66,
at 463, 464, 479-92; Michelle LeBaron & Nike Carstarphen, Case 15, Finding Common
Ground on Abortion, in THE CONSENSUS BUILDING HANDBOOK, supra note 66, at 1031,
1031-50.
109 See, e.g., Hanoch Dagan & Michael A. Heller, The Liberal Commons, 110 YALE L.J.
549, 590 (2001); Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the
Transition from Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621, 622-26 (1998).
110 See, e.g., SUSSKIND, supra note 106, at 22; Beierle & Cayford, supra note 55, at 60-61
(finding that more intensive participatory processes such as negotiations and mediations are
typically more successful than hearings and meetings on measures such as incorporating
public values into decisions, improving decision quality, resolving conflict, building trust,
and educating the public); Juliana E. Birkhoff & Kem Lowry, Whose Reality Counts?, in
THE PROMISE AND PERFORMANCE OF ENVIRONMENTAL CONFLICT RESOLUTION, supra note
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Finally, this critique of the Glen Canyon Dam AMWG does not suggest
that a multilateral stakeholder approach to resolving natural resource disputes is
inferior to the more traditional, notice-and-comment mode to administrative
decision-making. The traditional regulatory approach fragments the information-gathering and decision-making authority and responsibility regarding these
important natural resource disputes to a range of different administrative agencies. One need only consider the various state, tribal, and federal agencies participating in the AMWG to see that without the AMWG, there would be at least
as much uncertainty regarding the appropriate accommodation of the many
competing authorities governing the Glen Canyon Dam. Furthermore, traditional notice-and-comment regulatory decision-making too regularly treats public participation as a procedural burden,111 rather than as a crucial way to
obtain valuable information and to improve accountability.112
The point is that there is little evidence that Congress, the Secretary, or the
AMWG considered these structural issues in any careful and public way. Furthermore, neither Congress nor the Secretary nor the Glen Canyon Dam AMP
has ever systematically monitored or reviewed the structural characteristics of
the AMWG’s adopted decision-making process—including the convenor’s role
and the decision rule—to assess how effective they were in achieving progress
toward the program’s goals. As a result, whether the AMWG’s considerable
outlay of public and private financial and human resources has been worth it is
at best of unknown value—which alone should be considered a
disappointment.
CONCLUSION
The Glen Canyon Dam AMP serves as a valuable illustration of the flaws
of existing regulatory processes purporting to incorporate collaboration and
regulatory adaptation into the decision-making process. In doing so, it provides
considerable information on ways that future collaborative experiments might
be modified to enhance their prospects at success. In fact, any regulatory program, experimental or otherwise, could benefit from a careful consideration of
the lessons of the Glen Canyon Dam AMP.
In its own haphazard way, the Glen Canyon Dam AMP encouragingly
provides an opportunity for regulatory learning that the Department of the Inte55, at 27, 36 (summarizing studies reporting that participants found environmental mediation
processes more satisfying); Mette Brogden, The Assessment of Environmental Outcomes, in
THE PROMISE AND PERFORMANCE OF ENVIRONMENTAL CONFLICT RESOLUTION, supra note
55, at 277, 287 (“Multistakeholder processes increase both scientific and individually held
knowledge about the natural environment.”); Camacho, Mustering Part 2, supra note 5, at
311, 313; Laura I. Langbein & Cornelius M. Kerwin, Regulatory Negotiation Versus Conventional Rulemaking: Claims, Counterclaims, and Empirical Evidence, 10 J. PUB. ADMIN.
RES. & THEORY 599, 625-26 (2000) (concluding that negotiated regulations typically result
in significantly higher participant satisfaction with both final rules and the overall process).
111 See, e.g., Camacho, Can Regulation Evolve?, supra note 5, at 317; cf. Camacho, Mustering Part 1, supra note 5, at 35-42.
112 Cf. Camacho, Mustering Part 2, supra note 5, at 279, 301 (arguing that participation can
thwart corruption, provide important information about the interests and preferences of
affected parties, and enhance governmental accountability).
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rior, and indeed other regulatory agencies, would do well to heed. As a
straightforward but frequently disregarded lesson, the AMP demonstrates the
necessity for greater attentiveness to the design of regulatory processes. As for
any type of experimental regulation, regulators need to reflect thoroughly about
the specifics of collaborative regulatory experiments, including the types and
forms of participation by interested parties, stakeholder group composition, the
decision rule, and the role of the convenor in facilitating decision-making.
Simply leaving collaborative and adaptive approaches to the vagaries of improvised politics is a sure-fire way to ensure that the regulatory innovation does
not succeed.
Perhaps more importantly, regulatory programs need to integrate into the
program’s institutional fabric mechanisms that allow the regulatory program to
be scrupulously evaluated and adapted in furtherance of the program’s public
goals. To this end, there must be some measurable clarity as to the purposes of
the regulatory program at the outset. Though some proponents of collaborative
regulatory approaches emphasize the value and even necessity of developing
regulatory solutions in an ad hoc manner,113 at least a preliminary formulation
of the program’s goals and standards for attaining such targets is necessary for
the program both to progress and to be evaluated. Regulatory innovation also
requires a structure for monitoring and evaluating the administering agency’s
ability to achieve program goals, and a method for adapting the program to
perform better.
Undoubtedly, the experience in Glen Canyon demonstrates the considerable challenges regulatory designers face in integrating multilateral stakeholder
groups into decision-making, fostering collaboration instead of conflict, and
using subsequent information obtained about early regulatory assessments to
adjust these regulatory judgments. Yet the considerable, long-established
defects of conventional regulatory processes unavoidably counsel for the continued exploration for regulatory approaches that are more democratic, efficient, and effective. Though there is much to take issue with in the design of
the Glen Canyon Dam AMP, few would argue with the value of increasing the
adaptive capacity of programs in attaining regulatory goals or in pursuing regulatory processes that attempt to link participation to when decisions are actually
made. However, by building a more systematically experimentalist architecture into administrative processes, ultimately regulators—and indeed Congress
and the public at large—can seek to forego Powell’s “conjecture” in favor of
experience.

113

See supra note 66 and accompanying text.

